recipe-implement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided content from the
$ARGUMENTSvariable directly into its decision-making logic without the use of boundary markers or sanitization instructions. This makes the agent vulnerable to indirect prompt injection where a user or an external source could provide instructions that override the orchestrator's intended flow. - Ingestion points: The
$ARGUMENTSvariable inSKILL.mdused for situation assessment. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters (e.g., XML tags or code blocks) or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the input.
- Capability inventory: Access to the
Bashtool (used for git operations and file deletion), theAgenttool (for sub-agent delegation), and task management tools (TaskCreate,TaskUpdate). - Sanitization: Absent. No logic is provided to validate or escape the input provided via
$ARGUMENTSbefore it is processed by the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
Bashtool for several operations, including git commits and the deletion of implementation task files in thedocs/plans/tasks/directory. Although these are intended features of the orchestration lifecycle, the combination of file deletion capabilities using patterns derived from path names and the aforementioned injection surface presents a risk of unintended file modification or deletion.
Audit Metadata