recipe-build
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an "autonomous execution mode" that treats the initial user instruction as a "batch approval," effectively bypassing human-in-the-loop verification for individual sub-agent tasks and code commits.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests task files from the
docs/plans/tasks/directory and treats them as the "primary instruction source" for sub-agents without implementing sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points: Task files located in
docs/plans/tasks/matching the pattern{plan-name}-task-*.md(as defined inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can spawn multiple sub-agents (
task-executor,quality-fixer, etc.), executegit commitcommands, and delete files from the local filesystem. - Sanitization: Absent; no escaping or validation of the task file content is performed before passing it to sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill autonomously performs filesystem and version control operations, including executing
git commitand deleting task-related files in thedocs/plans/tasks/directory upon completion of the implementation cycle.
Audit Metadata