recipe-front-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
rg(ripgrep) orgrepto bootstrap the analysis scope by searching the codebase for relevant files. The search patterns are dynamically constructed from keywords extracted from user requirements provided in$ARGUMENTS. If user-supplied input contains shell metacharacters (such as single quotes that could break out of the pattern wrapping), it could lead to unintended command execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes content from the local codebase and user requirements, which are then passed to sub-agents as instructional context.
- Ingestion points: User-provided requirements in
$ARGUMENTS, the contents of files identified during the codebase search, and user-specified prototype code paths. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions to sub-agents (like codebase-analyzer or ui-analyzer) to distinguish between system instructions and untrusted data from the codebase.
- Capability inventory: The workflow involves shell command execution for file searching, spawning multiple specialized sub-agents via
spawn_agent, reading files from the repository, and writing design artifacts to thedocs/directory. - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content ingested from the codebase before it is used to influence agent behavior.
Audit Metadata