recipe-reverse-engineer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of analyzing external codebase content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the user-specified
target_path(SKILL.md) which is then processed by multiple sub-agents. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to prevent agents from following commands embedded in the source code being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including spawning multiple sub-agents (
spawn_agent), reading arbitrary files within the target path, and writing documentation to the local filesystem (docs/prd/,docs/design/). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or escaping of the ingested code before it is passed to the AI models.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a user-provided
$ARGUMENTSvariable to define the target directory inSKILL.md. This pattern represents a risk if the platform execution environment fails to sanitize these arguments before using them in file system or shell-based operations.
Audit Metadata