recipe-pr-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runacross multiple scripts (collect-pr-context.py,run-review.py,post-comments.py) to execute system tools such asgit,gh(GitHub CLI),claude, andcodex. This is fundamental to the skill's ability to fetch PR data, run reviewer engines, and post comments.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from GitHub PRs, including diffs, file contents, and comments, which could contain adversarial prompts. 1. Ingestion points: PR diffs and comments are collected inscripts/collect-pr-context.pyand provided to models viascripts/get-review-material.py. 2. Boundary markers: Thereferences/reviewer-system-prompt.mddefines a strict role for the model, and the skill uses a separate orchestrator/reviewer architecture. 3. Capability inventory: The orchestrator executesgitandghvia subprocess. Nested reviewer models are restricted to read-only environments or have write-capable tools disabled. 4. Sanitization: All reviewer output is validated against a formal JSON schema (schemas/review-result.schema.json) using a dedicated validation hook (scripts/guard-plugin/scripts/require-final-json.py) before being processed by the orchestrator.- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Thescripts/run-review.pyscript executes nested Claude reviewer instances using the--permission-mode bypassPermissionsflag. This flag allows tools to execute without manual user confirmation, facilitating non-interactive automation. The risk is mitigated by explicitly disabling all write-capable tools (Write,Edit,MultiEdit,NotebookEdit) for the nested instances.
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