sub-agents
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to spawn and delegate tasks to external CLI-based AI agents including codex, claude, cursor-agent, glm, kimi, grok, antigravity, gemini, opencode, and command-code.
- Evidence:
scripts/_builder.pyconstructs command-line arguments for these tools, andscripts/_executor.pyusessubprocess.Popento execute them. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill implements a 'permission' system for sub-agents that includes a 'yolo' level, which explicitly bypasses safety mechanisms and sandboxes of the underlying CLI tools.
- Evidence: In
scripts/_builder.py, theyolopermission mapping includes flags such as--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox(for Codex),--dangerously-skip-permissions(for Claude), and--yolo(for Command-Code). - Evidence:
references/codex.mdexplicitly instructs the agent to use escalated permissions to avoid sandbox restrictions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external agent definitions from Markdown files, which determine the system context and permission levels of the sub-agent.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/_loader.pyreads.mdand.txtfiles from the.agents/directory or a path specified by theSUB_AGENTS_DIRenvironment variable. - Boundary markers: The skill uses basic headers like
[System Context]and[User Prompt]inscripts/_constants.pyto separate instructions, but lacks robust isolation between the definition file content and the user request. - Capability inventory: The sub-agents executed via
scripts/_executor.pyhave significant capabilities including file system access and bash execution (especially when theyolopermission is used). - Sanitization: The skill uses
shell=Falsefor process spawning to prevent command injection, but does not sanitize the natural language instructions extracted from the definition files before passing them to the sub-agent.
Audit Metadata