spec-project
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted product intent, PRDs, and feature specifications to drive the project lifecycle. These inputs are interpolated into the agent's context, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from
docs/PRD.md,docs/feature-breakdown.md,specs/*/spec.md, and user-provided product intent descriptions. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers (e.g., XML tags) or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when the agent processes these artifacts.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform file system operations (writing specs and plans), execute shell commands via the
specifyCLI, and orchestrate other skills like/shiplight. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or structural validation performed on the ingested content before it is used to influence the agent's planning and implementation steps.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and integrates with external tools and repositories.
- Trusted Source: References the GitHub Spec Kit documentation and repository located at
github.com/github/spec-kit. This targets a trusted organization. - Installation Command: The documentation suggests installing the skill using
npx skills add ShiplightAI/quality/agent-skills, which uses theskillspackage from the official NPM registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates the project workflow by executing external commands and other agent skills.
- Tool Delegation: It invokes the
specifyCLI for Spec Kit mode and the/shiplightskill (using commands like/shiplight coverand/shiplight verify) for testing and verification tasks.
Audit Metadata