devcontainer-setup
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Exposure of sensitive host directories
- The skill's templates for
devcontainer.jsonanddocker-compose.ymlinclude bind mounts for the host's~/.claudedirectory. This folder contains sensitive CLI configuration, command history, and session data for the Claude CLI. - The configuration allows for a broad mount of the parent directory (
../..), which exposes the entire folder hierarchy above the project to the containerized environment. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Privileged execution environment
- The generated
devcontainer.jsonspecifies"remoteUser": "root", which grants processes within the container full administrative privileges. - The skill requires making the generated
setup.shexecutable, facilitating the execution of custom scripts within this privileged context. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Script generation and runtime execution
- The skill generates a
setup.shscript and aDockerfileat runtime, which are subsequently executed during the container build and post-creation phases. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Unsanitized input in configuration templates
- The skill interpolates user-supplied strings directly into configuration files and shell scripts without validation or escaping.
- Ingestion points: User-provided project names, port labels, and monorepo paths gathered in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None implemented in the file templates to isolate user data from executable commands.
- Capability inventory: Filesystem write access to
.devcontainer/and shell command execution viapostCreateCommand. - Sanitization: No evidence of input sanitization or verification before interpolation into sensitive files like
setup.shandDockerfile.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata