devcontainer-setup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Exposure of sensitive host directories
  • The skill's templates for devcontainer.json and docker-compose.yml include bind mounts for the host's ~/.claude directory. This folder contains sensitive CLI configuration, command history, and session data for the Claude CLI.
  • The configuration allows for a broad mount of the parent directory (../..), which exposes the entire folder hierarchy above the project to the containerized environment.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Privileged execution environment
  • The generated devcontainer.json specifies "remoteUser": "root", which grants processes within the container full administrative privileges.
  • The skill requires making the generated setup.sh executable, facilitating the execution of custom scripts within this privileged context.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Script generation and runtime execution
  • The skill generates a setup.sh script and a Dockerfile at runtime, which are subsequently executed during the container build and post-creation phases.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Unsanitized input in configuration templates
  • The skill interpolates user-supplied strings directly into configuration files and shell scripts without validation or escaping.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided project names, port labels, and monorepo paths gathered in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None implemented in the file templates to isolate user data from executable commands.
  • Capability inventory: Filesystem write access to .devcontainer/ and shell command execution via postCreateCommand.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input sanitization or verification before interpolation into sensitive files like setup.sh and Dockerfile.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 04:47 PM