fullstack-workspace-init

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workspace initialization script scripts/init-workspace.py uses subprocess.run() to execute a local script at ~/.codex/skills/agent-folder-init/scripts/scaffold.py. This is a design choice to delegate agent-specific folder setup to a related skill.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's primary function in SKILL.md is to run npx @shipshitdev/v0. This downloads and executes the author's scaffolding package from the public NPM registry. The package belongs to the verified skill author ('shipshitdev').
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted user data (product briefs and entity descriptions) to drive code generation, as described in references/legacy-manual-route.md.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided product descriptions, entity names, and field definitions.
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the manual intake instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system write access and local command execution capabilities through its Python scripts.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization logic shown for entity names or field descriptions before they are interpolated into code templates.
  • [SAFE]: All external service references in references/deployment-guide.md and elsewhere target well-known, trusted providers including Clerk (Auth), MongoDB Atlas (Database), and Vercel, Railway, and Render (Deployment). Hardcoded environment variable keys in the documentation are placeholders and do not contain actual secrets.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 3, 2026, 12:30 AM