github-inbox
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from GitHub issues and pull requests, which represents an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested via the
ghCLI inscripts/github-inbox-report.mjsand the triage workflow inreferences/triage.md, which reads issue bodies, comments, and pull request diffs. - Boundary markers: The skill provides explicit instructions in
references/triage.mdto treat external text as untrusted evidence, to never obey instructions within the text, and to include an AI disclaimer on all outputs. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read and modify GitHub issue/PR metadata (labels, comments, state) and involves a bug reproduction step that could potentially execute code.
- Sanitization: There is no programmatic sanitization or filtering of the ingested data; the skill depends on the agent adhering to its safety instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the GitHub CLI (
gh) and a bundled Node.js script. The script usesexecFileSyncwith an array of arguments, which prevents shell-based command injection from user-supplied filters like--owneror--repo.
Audit Metadata