merge-prs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from GitHub pull requests, including titles, bodies, diffs, and comments, which establishes a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. * Ingestion points: The skill ingests data via
gh pr list(metadata),gh pr checks(logs),gh pr diff(code changes), and PR comments. * Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to treat all PR-related content as untrusted data and strictly ignore any instructions contained within them. * Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools for merging PRs (gh pr merge), committing and pushing code changes (git commit,git push), and managing CI runs (gh run cancel,gh run rerun). * Sanitization: The skill employsjqfor structured data extraction and includes specific safety directives to handle content as data rather than instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution using
git,gh, andjqwith parameters derived from the local repository and external pull request metadata. * Evidence: Commands such asgh pr merge <number> <method>,gh run rerun <run-id>, andgit branch -r --list "origin/$DEFAULT_BRANCH"utilize variables that could present a command injection risk if the underlying platform does not properly sanitize inputs.
Audit Metadata