recall
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple sources including chat history, shared records (via the
whyskill), and GitHub issues/PRs viagh. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Steps 3, 4, 5) andrecall-procedure.md(Steps 3, 4, 5) describe reading chat transcripts, issue trackers, and documentation to reconstruct context. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks instructions for using robust delimiters (such as XML tags or unique markers) when interpolating external data into prompts, which could allow data to be interpreted as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
gitandghtools and is authorized to spawn subagents for parallel processing. - Sanitization: The instructions include a high-level directive to 'Sanitize private context before any public output.'
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes system-level commands to gather project context.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Step 5) andrecall-procedure.md(Step 5) instruct the agent to usegitandgh(GitHub CLI) to verify the live state of the project. This is consistent with the skill's documented purpose for recalling work status.
Audit Metadata