tdd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (feature requests, bug reports, PRDs) to generate code and verification tests, creating an attack surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the 'Contract' inputs in
SKILL.md, such as feature requests and bug reports. - Boundary markers: The skill enforces a strict 'Red-Green-Refactor' workflow which requires independent verification at each step, acting as a logical boundary. However, it does not define explicit data delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions embedded within the inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to create or modify production and test files, and execute verification commands (identified in
SKILL.mdandreferences/tdd-procedure.md). - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions to sanitize or escape input data before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute verification commands as a core part of its workflow.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/tdd-procedure.mdinstruct the agent to identify and run the 'narrowest executable check' to verify behavior. Thereferences/tdd-procedure.mdfile specifically notes that the agent should only use capabilities the active harness actually exposes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation and metadata reference external GitHub repositories for source attribution and synchronization.
- Evidence: Links to
anthropics/claude-plugins-official,cursor/plugins,mattpocock/skills, andericlitman/open-pstackappear inREADME.md,SKILL.md, andlicenses/NOTICE.txt. - Context: These are informational references for upstream tracking and do not involve direct runtime network operations or remote code execution commands.
Audit Metadata