worktree
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command interpolation using variables derived from repository metadata (e.g., branch names) and user input. Specifically, variables such as
$NAMEand$BRANCHare used ingit worktree addand other Bash logic. Without strict escaping of shell-sensitive characters, this presents a surface for command injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of repository state. Maliciously crafted branch names could potentially manipulate the logic in Phase 2 (Base Branch Resolution) or trigger unintended behavior during Phase 5 (Worktree Creation).
- Ingestion points: Branch names from
git symbolic-ref,git worktree list, and user-provided inputs (SKILL.md Phase 1 & 2). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are specified for variable interpolation in instructions.
- Capability inventory: Execution of
gitcommands, file system writes to.gitignore, and repository commits (SKILL.md Phase 4 & 5). - Sanitization: The instructions recommend sanitizing directory names but lack specific guidance on escaping branch names for shell safety.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes an optional
--fetchflag that triggers agit fetch origincommand. While this is a standard repository maintenance task, it involves a network request to the configured remote server to retrieve repository metadata and objects.
Audit Metadata