open-pptd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches pre-compiled binary assets and installation scripts from the vendor's GitHub repository (
shiquda/open-pptd-skill) during the setup process. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves downloading and executing an installation script from GitHub. Additionally, the skill installs and runs a native binary compiler (
pptd) to handle core presentation tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Orchestrates the
pptdcompiler and system tools such asLibreOfficeandpdftoppmusingsubprocess.runto perform PDF conversion and image rasterization. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection when processing untrusted presentation data.
- Ingestion points: Ingests data from external
.pptxand.pptdfiles viascripts/convert_pptx.py,scripts/export_pptx.py, andscripts/validate_pptx.py. - Boundary markers: Relies on YAML structure for configuration but lacks explicit markers or instructions to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within slide content.
- Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution, file system operations, and network access (for installation) across its script library.
- Sanitization: Content extracted from source presentations is processed without comprehensive sanitization before being presented to the agent context.
Audit Metadata