sanity-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
codex exec --ephemeralcommand to execute a dynamically generated prompt file. This is performed to verify the model tier and reasoning capabilities of the environment. Generating and executing code at runtime is a potential vector for exploitation if the generation logic is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes shell commands via the GitHub CLI (
gh) to retrieve PR details, comments, and diffs, and to post review results. It also usescommand -vto check for the existence of local binaries. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests large amounts of untrusted data from GitHub PRs and local context files.
- Ingestion points: Pull request titles, bodies, and comments are fetched via
gh pr viewandgh api. Diffs are fetched viagh pr diff. Local context files are read from.dev/contexts/using theReadtool. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' prompts when passing this untrusted data to the agent or external consultation tools.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, read and write files, and post content to external GitHub repositories.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the PR content before it is processed for review or passed to sub-agents.
Audit Metadata