subagent-consultation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process output from a subagent (another LLM) and repository content (uncommitted changes, design documents, task summaries). This creates a vulnerability surface where data provided to the agent could attempt to influence its behavior or subvert its instructions.
- Ingestion points: Subagent output and repository files (code, design documentation, implementation plans) processed during the review and consultation steps in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not mandate specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the subagent's response or the repository data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to use
Bash(for command execution) and theAgenttool (for spawning subagents) as described in SKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or filtering the content retrieved from the repository or the subagent before it is processed or reported to the user.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use a
Bashtool to execute shell commands (e.g.,gh pr view) to manually verify information if a subagent execution fails or returns insufficient data, as noted in the 'subagentの実行失敗を検知した場合' section of SKILL.md.
Audit Metadata