spice-circuit-modeling
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/netlist_compare.pyperforms dynamic evaluation of numeric expressions using theeval()function. Although the input is restricted by a regular expression to basic mathematical operators and numbers, the execution of code parsed from external files is a dynamic execution risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's scripts, including
scripts/spice_order_stress.pyandscripts/spice_manifest.py, usesubprocess.run()to invoke external circuit simulators. Specifically,spice_order_stress.pyallows the simulator command to be configured via a template, which could be exploited for command injection if an attacker influences the command string. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes SPICE netlist and library files, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The scripts
scripts/netlist_compare.pyandscripts/spice_order_stress.pyread.cirand.libfiles. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters are used to separate circuit data from potential instructions, though the parser is restrictive.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read/write files and execute external shell commands via
subprocess. - Sanitization: The scripts use a fail-closed parser and a whitelist of safe simulator commands to mitigate risks from malicious netlist directives.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/spice_order_stress.pyscript generates modified versions of SPICE decks by reordering statements and then executes these files using a sub-process, representing a script-generation-and-execution pattern.
Audit Metadata