reflect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze session transcripts, which are untrusted data that may contain malicious instructions meant to influence the analysis subagents.
- Ingestion points: The skill locates and reads JSONL transcript files from directories such as
$PSTACK_TRANSCRIPTS_DIR(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Subagent prompts (
divergent-reviewer.md,judgment-reviewer.md,tooling-reviewer.md,synthesizer.md) contain explicit warnings that transcripts may contain prompt-injection attempts and instruct the models to ignore any embedded directives. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read local files, spawn subagent tasks, access MCP tools (like ticket trackers or observability tools), and modify skill files (
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The process enforces a human-in-the-loop requirement, where the agent must present all proposed edits to the user and wait for explicit approval before modifying any files. Reviewers are also instructed to maintain a read-only posture regarding MCP tools.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to identify and list transcript files for processing.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains a bash snippet usingls,head, andheadto retrieve the most recent transcript files from the agent's history directory.
Audit Metadata