visual-style
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an 'Extract' workflow in
references/extractors/from-website.md,references/extractors/from-pdf.md, andreferences/extractors/from-video.mdthat ingests content from untrusted external sources. - Ingestion points: Website URLs, PDF brand guides, and video keyframes are processed to synthesize a
style_prompt_fullfield. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the source data.
- Capability inventory: The generated output is directly interpolated into prompts for the HeyGen Video Agent (
references/connectors/heygen-video-agent.md), which executes instructions to create AI video content. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted natural language content is performed before interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
references/connectors/html-slides.mdconnector generates standalone HTML slide presentations with embedded CSS and JavaScript based on design system metadata. If the design system is extracted from a malicious source, it could lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) or the execution of unauthorized client-side scripts when the slides are opened in a browser. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
references/connectors/html-slides.mdreferences an external, unverified GitHub repository (github.com/zarazhangrui/frontend-slides) as a recommended framework. While this is a documentation reference and not an automated dependency installation, it directs users to third-party code without integrity verification.
Audit Metadata