watch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from external video sources, such as transcripts, subtitles, and metadata, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
scripts/watch.py, which processes external video content and transcription results. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted transcript text from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
BashandReadtools, providing a capability surface if successfully injected. - Sanitization: Subtitle text is extracted but not sanitized or filtered for potential malicious instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external binaries to process media files.
- Evidence:
scripts/download.py,scripts/frames.py, andscripts/setup.pyutilizesubprocess.run()to invokeffmpeg,ffprobe, andyt-dlp. - Arguments are passed as lists, which follows security best practices to prevent shell injection.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of external tools and media content.
- Evidence:
scripts/setup.pymanages the installation offfmpegandyt-dlpviaHomebrew(macOS) orWinGet(Windows). - Evidence:
scripts/download.pyusesyt-dlpto fetch video and subtitle files from user-provided URLs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill sends audio data extracted from videos to third-party transcription services.
- Evidence:
scripts/whisper_api.pyuploads audio files toapi.groq.com(Groq) andapi.openai.com(OpenAI). - This behavior is essential for the skill's functionality and utilizes well-known service endpoints.
Audit Metadata