watch

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from external video sources, such as transcripts, subtitles, and metadata, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through scripts/watch.py, which processes external video content and transcription results.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted transcript text from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash and Read tools, providing a capability surface if successfully injected.
  • Sanitization: Subtitle text is extracted but not sanitized or filtered for potential malicious instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external binaries to process media files.
  • Evidence: scripts/download.py, scripts/frames.py, and scripts/setup.py utilize subprocess.run() to invoke ffmpeg, ffprobe, and yt-dlp.
  • Arguments are passed as lists, which follows security best practices to prevent shell injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of external tools and media content.
  • Evidence: scripts/setup.py manages the installation of ffmpeg and yt-dlp via Homebrew (macOS) or WinGet (Windows).
  • Evidence: scripts/download.py uses yt-dlp to fetch video and subtitle files from user-provided URLs.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill sends audio data extracted from videos to third-party transcription services.
  • Evidence: scripts/whisper_api.py uploads audio files to api.groq.com (Groq) and api.openai.com (OpenAI).
  • This behavior is essential for the skill's functionality and utilizes well-known service endpoints.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 09:44 AM