opencode-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes git diffs and repository files, which represent untrusted data that could contain malicious instructions aimed at influencing the reviewer models.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/run-review.shscript extracts git diffs and passes them to the fact-check model. The SWE and Architect models are given tools to read repository files. - Boundary markers: Persona files (e.g.,
prompts/swe.md,prompts/architect.md) include explicit warnings to the models that the input diff is untrusted and that no code should be executed. - Capability inventory: The
opencodeexecution environment is strictly limited using theOPENCODE_PERMISSIONenvironment variable, which denies tool access for editing, network operations, and execution of arbitrary shell commands (using a read-only allow-list forbash). - Sanitization: The raw diff and file content are provided to the models without specific sanitization or filtering of potential injection payloads.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing local
gitandopencodecommands to collect data and perform the review. - The
scripts/run-review.shscript invokes variousgitsubcommands (diff, show, log, status, etc.) and theopencodeCLI to drive the LLM-based review process. - These commands are essential for the skill's operation and are called with appropriate arguments to prevent simple command injection (e.g., using
--separators ingitcommands).
Audit Metadata