dp-session-forensics-cloud
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script uses
importlib.utilto dynamically load and execute theask_teams_agent.pymodule. While it defaults to a sibling directory, the file path is determined by the--teams-scriptargument, allowing the execution of arbitrary Python files if the input is manipulated. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.run()to forward commands to a local forensic script (query_sessions.py). This allows the agent to trigger secondary process execution on the host system. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a sensitive local environment file at a hardcoded Windows path (
C:/code_proj/gitlab-proj/agent-eval/.env) to readAGENT_TEAMS_TOKENandAGENT_TEAMS_TOKEN_PRODfor API authentication. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface by processing external data from session messages.
- Ingestion points: Fetches session titles and full message content through the
TeamsClientfrom cloud API endpoints (/api/chat/sessions,/api/chat/sessions/{id}/messages). - Boundary markers: No explicit markers or warnings are used when rendering or exporting session content.
- Capability inventory: Includes file system operations (write_text, mkdir), process execution (subprocess.run), and module execution (importlib.util).
- Sanitization: The skill does not sanitize or escape the content fetched from the API before displaying it or writing it to local files.
Audit Metadata