dp-session-forensics-cloud

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script uses importlib.util to dynamically load and execute the ask_teams_agent.py module. While it defaults to a sibling directory, the file path is determined by the --teams-script argument, allowing the execution of arbitrary Python files if the input is manipulated.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run() to forward commands to a local forensic script (query_sessions.py). This allows the agent to trigger secondary process execution on the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a sensitive local environment file at a hardcoded Windows path (C:/code_proj/gitlab-proj/agent-eval/.env) to read AGENT_TEAMS_TOKEN and AGENT_TEAMS_TOKEN_PROD for API authentication.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface by processing external data from session messages.
  • Ingestion points: Fetches session titles and full message content through the TeamsClient from cloud API endpoints (/api/chat/sessions, /api/chat/sessions/{id}/messages).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit markers or warnings are used when rendering or exporting session content.
  • Capability inventory: Includes file system operations (write_text, mkdir), process execution (subprocess.run), and module execution (importlib.util).
  • Sanitization: The skill does not sanitize or escape the content fetched from the API before displaying it or writing it to local files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 12, 2026, 06:53 AM