agy-auto
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to download the
agy-autotoolkit from an untrusted community repository (github.com/onkarbadve/agy-auto). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation and configuration process involves executing shell scripts (
install.sh,hook.sh) and running Python test suites directly from the downloaded content. While the skill suggests manual review, the primary workflow relies on executing external, unverified code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the user to set
toolPermission: "always-proceed"in the Antigravity CLI settings. This disables the native human-in-the-loop security gate, delegating all permission decisions to the downloaded third-party scripts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a security gate for processing tool calls generated by an LLM agent, making it a target for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
hook.shscript intercepts arbitrary command strings and arguments generated by the agent. - Boundary markers: The skill claims to use deterministic policies (Hard Deny/Fast Allow) and an LLM classifier to delimit safe actions.
- Capability inventory: The system manages significant capabilities including shell command execution (
run_command), file modifications, and network egress. - Sanitization: The skill relies on an LLM-based classifier (Gemini or local model) and a token-based approval system to sanitize and validate untrusted agent inputs.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The
install.shscript registers theagy-autohook inhooks.json, ensuring the external code persists and runs automatically whenever the CLI is invoked in the future.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata