agy-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using
nodeand theagyCLI to delegate coding tasks to a separate implementer agent.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.\n - Ingestion points: External
brief.txtfiles (task instructions) and thefinalMessageproperty ofresult.jsonwhich contains the output from the delegated agent.\n - Boundary markers: The documentation includes detailed manual review checklists in
references/review-and-land.mdto verify all implementer output before committing.\n - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
node,agy) and modify the local filesystem viagit.\n - Sanitization: There is no automated sanitization of incoming briefs; the skill relies entirely on human-in-the-loop review and project-specific testing gates.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation describes the use of a helper script,
scripts/relay.mjs, which is not bundled with the provided files and must be downloaded from a third-party community repository (amElnagdy/delegate-skills).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation includes the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag, which is designed to bypass security and permission prompts within the implementer's execution environment.
Audit Metadata