aider-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a workflow for processing external 'briefs' through an LLM-based implementer, creating a vulnerability surface for instruction injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted instructions enter the system via the
brief.txtfile (referenced in SKILL.md and dispatch-and-poll.md). - Boundary markers: Documentation suggests using structured headers (GOAL, CHANGE, GATES) but correctly warns that these do not constitute a security boundary.
- Capability inventory: The implementer (Aider) possesses file-system write access and the ability to execute repository-defined shell commands via linting and testing hooks.
- Sanitization: The skill relies on manual human review of diffs ('Review and Land' policy) rather than programmatic sanitization of the brief content.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions recommend the installation of the
aider-chatPython package from PyPI. This is a well-known open-source tool for AI-assisted development.
Audit Metadata