apify-audience-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted social media data (such as comments, profiles, and post content) scraped via Apify Actors. This data is displayed in the chat and summarized by the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions hidden in social media content could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from Apify's dataset API in
run_actor.jsand presented to the agent for summarization in Step 5 ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when interpolating external data into the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
mcpc,node) and write files to the local system. - Sanitization: While
run_actor.jsperforms basic escaping to prevent CSV formula injection, no sanitization or filtering is applied to protect the LLM from instructions embedded within the scraped text. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to execute shell commands involving themcpcCLI tool and the providedrun_actor.jsscript. These commands include environment variable extraction usinggrepandxargsand piping output tojq. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to Apify's official API domains (
api.apify.com,mcp.apify.com) to fetch actor schemas and download scraping results. It also requires the installation of the@apify/mcpcglobal NPM package. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses the
APIFY_TOKENcredential stored in a.envfile to authenticate requests to Apify services.
Audit Metadata