apple-container

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use sudo for administrative operations that modify host-level DNS configuration (e.g., sudo container system dns create).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill involves downloading a binary installer package from Apple's official GitHub repository and fetching OCI images from external registries. It also describes functionality to download Linux kernels from user-provided remote URLs using the container system kernel set --tar command.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides instructions for mounting host filesystem paths into containers and copying files between the host and container environments (container cp), which presents a risk of sensitive data access if host paths are not restricted.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from third-party OCI images and external registries.
  • Ingestion points: OCI image layers and registry metadata pulled from external sources (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill includes explicit safety warnings advising the user to "Inspect and trust the image source before pulling or running it" and "obtain explicit user approval" (SKILL.md).
  • Capability inventory: File read/write via container cp, network operations via registry interactions, and arbitrary command execution within containers via container exec and container run.
  • Sanitization: No specific content sanitization or isolation mechanisms for image content are described beyond the tool's VM-based isolation.
  • [NO_CODE]: The skill folder contains only markdown documentation and does not include any executable scripts or binary files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 4, 2026, 07:40 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — apple-container