blueprint
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions direct the agent to clone an external repository from GitHub (
https://github.com/antbotlab/blueprint.git). While the instructions utilize a pinned commit hash for reproducibility and recommend a review process, the repository belongs to an organization that is not on the verified list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a sequence of shell commands for the agent to perform during the setup phase, including
mktemp,git clone,git checkout,git ls-files, andgit status. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves scanning the active codebase and project memory to generate plans. This creates a potential ingestion surface for malicious instructions hidden in the files being analyzed.
- Ingestion points: Reads local codebase files and project memory during the 'Research' phase (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing external file content.
- Capability inventory: The skill is designed to run 'pre-flight checks' and generate execution plans, which may involve further tool or shell operations.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the scanned codebase content is documented in the instructions.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill manifest contains a
risk: criticalfield. While this appears to be an author-defined safety warning rather than a deceptive tactic, it is a non-standard use of metadata fields that could influence an agent's perception of its own safety profile.
Audit Metadata