brooks-harness
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various local shell commands through
npmscripts, specificallynpm run evals,npm run validate, andnpm testas part of its QA and curation phases. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator spawns multiple sub-agents (
skill-author,eval-curator,consistency-qa,trigger-boundary-auditor,release-manager) using theAgenttool to perform automated repository modifications and release management. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes high-risk git operations including pushing directly to the
mainbranch, potentially bypassing standard Pull Request (PR) workflows, and mentions the use of flags such as--no-verifyand--forcefor history manipulation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its sequential sub-agent pipeline architecture, where content or summaries generated by one agent are consumed as instructions by the next stage.
- Ingestion points: Summaries stored in
_workspace/brooks-harness/and modifications made to files inskills/andevals/are read and processed by subsequent pipeline stages. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit boundary markers or delimiters to isolate data from instructions when passing context between sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system writes, execution of npm scripts, and authenticated git operations (push/release).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content passed between the
author,eval, andQAstages.
Audit Metadata