browser-harness
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
browser-harnesscommand line tool executes Python code passed as a string via the-cflag. This allows for arbitrary code execution on the local machine where the script is invoked.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation guide instructs the agent to clone an external repository from GitHub (browser-use/browser-harness) and install it usinguv tool install. This pattern involves downloading and installing executable code from a third-party source.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a high surface area for indirect prompt injection as it retrieves and processes arbitrary content from web pages, including authenticated sessions.\n - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
page_info()calls, DOM extraction viajs()snippets, and visual screenshots of web pages.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to warn the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the extracted web content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell execution, local file writing, and network operations via CDP.\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the extracted DOM text or page data before the agent processes it.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides multiple shell commands for installation and maintenance, including
git clone,uv tool install,mkdir,ln -sf, andosascriptto automate the browser UI.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The installation process involves modifying global agent configuration files (like~/.claude/CLAUDE.md) to load the skill in every future session. It also utilizes a background daemon process that stays active across individual command runs.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates extraction of data from authenticated sessions (e.g., X/Twitter and LinkedIn). While the provided examples use restricted temporary files, the capability to read and process session-protected data could be exploited for exfiltration.
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