ci-cd-and-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration and templates involve downloading packages and binaries from well-known services.
- Fetches dependencies via
npmandnpxfrom the official npm registry. - Downloads browser binaries for Playwright using the
npx playwright installcommand. - Utilizes the Vercel CLI for automated deployments and preview environments.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill recommends a feedback loop where the agent processes external error logs to diagnose and fix pipeline failures.
- Ingestion points: External CI failure output (logs) is pasted into the agent's context (referenced in the 'Feeding CI Failures Back to Agents' section of
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not suggest using specific delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the log content.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to run commands such as
npm run lint --fix, modify source code, and perform git commits based on the provided log data. - Sanitization: Absent; logs are treated as natural language input without pre-processing or sanitization.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is an attribution discrepancy in the skill's metadata.
- The YAML frontmatter identifies the source as a repository by Addy Osmani (
addyosmani/agent-skills), while the provided author context indicates the skill is authored by 'sickn33'. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided GitHub Action template for rollbacks incorporates user-provided input directly into a shell command.
- The
Rollbackworkflow snippet uses${{ inputs.version }}inside thenpx vercel rollbackcommand. If this workflow is triggered with unsanitized input strings, it could serve as a vector for command injection within the CI environment.
Audit Metadata