ci-cd-and-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration and templates involve downloading packages and binaries from well-known services.
  • Fetches dependencies via npm and npx from the official npm registry.
  • Downloads browser binaries for Playwright using the npx playwright install command.
  • Utilizes the Vercel CLI for automated deployments and preview environments.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill recommends a feedback loop where the agent processes external error logs to diagnose and fix pipeline failures.
  • Ingestion points: External CI failure output (logs) is pasted into the agent's context (referenced in the 'Feeding CI Failures Back to Agents' section of SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not suggest using specific delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the log content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to run commands such as npm run lint --fix, modify source code, and perform git commits based on the provided log data.
  • Sanitization: Absent; logs are treated as natural language input without pre-processing or sanitization.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is an attribution discrepancy in the skill's metadata.
  • The YAML frontmatter identifies the source as a repository by Addy Osmani (addyosmani/agent-skills), while the provided author context indicates the skill is authored by 'sickn33'.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided GitHub Action template for rollbacks incorporates user-provided input directly into a shell command.
  • The Rollback workflow snippet uses ${{ inputs.version }} inside the npx vercel rollback command. If this workflow is triggered with unsanitized input strings, it could serve as a vector for command injection within the CI environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 04:44 AM