cmux
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use
sudoto create a symbolic link in the/usr/local/bin/directory, which requires administrative privilege escalation. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions include
npx skills add manaflow-ai/cmux -g -y, which downloads and executes code from a remote package repository at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the addition of a third-party Homebrew tap (
manaflow-ai/cmux) to install the application, introducing external code from a source outside of the pre-approved trusted list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The browser automation suite includes the
browser evalcommand, which allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within a browser surface. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection due to the following evidence chain:
- Ingestion points: The agent reads untrusted data from external web pages via
cmux browser snapshotandget text body, and from other terminal sessions usingcmux read-screen. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to send input to terminal panes (
cmux send), create new execution environments, and perform browser automation. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any defined validation or filtering for the data ingested from external sources.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata