cmux

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use sudo to create a symbolic link in the /usr/local/bin/ directory, which requires administrative privilege escalation.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions include npx skills add manaflow-ai/cmux -g -y, which downloads and executes code from a remote package repository at runtime.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the addition of a third-party Homebrew tap (manaflow-ai/cmux) to install the application, introducing external code from a source outside of the pre-approved trusted list.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The browser automation suite includes the browser eval command, which allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within a browser surface.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection due to the following evidence chain:
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads untrusted data from external web pages via cmux browser snapshot and get text body, and from other terminal sessions using cmux read-screen.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when processing this external content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to send input to terminal panes (cmux send), create new execution environments, and perform browser automation.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks any defined validation or filtering for the data ingested from external sources.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 5, 2026, 04:43 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cmux