coda-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to add
https://rube.app/mcpas an MCP server. This connects the agent to an external service that defines the tool schemas and controls the logic for Coda interactions. This introduces a dependency on a third-party service that is not part of the standard trusted vendor list. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides tools with high-risk capabilities that could be exploited for data exfiltration. Specifically,
CODA_ADD_PERMISSIONallows granting document access to external emails,CODA_PUBLISH_DOCmakes private documents publicly accessible via a URL, andCODA_BEGIN_CONTENT_EXPORTgenerates downloadable exports of document content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the data it processes.
- Ingestion points: Document data is ingested via
CODA_LIST_TABLE_ROWS,CODA_SEARCH_ROW,CODA_SEARCH_DOCS,CODA_LIST_PAGES, andCODA_GET_A_PAGE(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified. There are no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the document data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to sensitive operations including permission management (
CODA_ADD_PERMISSION), document publishing (CODA_PUBLISH_DOC), and content export (CODA_BEGIN_CONTENT_EXPORT). - Sanitization: None identified. Data retrieved from Coda is passed directly into the agent's context without filtering or escaping.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of API commands through the Rube MCP server. The instructions require the agent to call
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSandRUBE_MANAGE_CONNECTIONSto initialize the environment, delegating command authority to the external MCP endpoint.
Audit Metadata