codex-delegate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates a workflow where the agent processes code and reports generated by an external implementer (OpenAI Codex). This creates a vulnerability surface for instructions embedded in the implementer's output to potentially influence the orchestrator agent's subsequent actions.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md and references/dispatch-and-poll.md describe reading result.json, particularly the finalMessage and touchedFiles fields.
  • Boundary markers: The skill advises using structured XML tags in the task brief and defining a clear output contract to delimit implementer responses.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator agent is expected to execute shell commands for project verification (testing, linting) and git operations.
  • Sanitization: The skill implements robust defense-in-depth by instructing the agent to never trust the implementer's self-report, requiring manual diff verification and independent execution of project gate commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references external tools and packages from well-known sources.
  • Evidence: Mentions installation of the @openai/codex package via npm. OpenAI is recognized as a well-known service provider.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the orchestrator agent to execute shell commands to dispatch tasks.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains example commands for running a relay script using node and project-specific "gate" commands (tests, build scripts).
  • [SAFE]: The skill explicitly omits executable scripts (specifically scripts/relay.mjs) from its distribution. It provides documentation-only templates and advises the user to separately obtain and audit the necessary runtime components, reducing the risk of executing unverified bundled code.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 12:19 AM