codex-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates a workflow where the agent processes code and reports generated by an external implementer (OpenAI Codex). This creates a vulnerability surface for instructions embedded in the implementer's output to potentially influence the orchestrator agent's subsequent actions.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdandreferences/dispatch-and-poll.mddescribe readingresult.json, particularly thefinalMessageandtouchedFilesfields. - Boundary markers: The skill advises using structured XML tags in the task brief and defining a clear output contract to delimit implementer responses.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator agent is expected to execute shell commands for project verification (testing, linting) and git operations.
- Sanitization: The skill implements robust defense-in-depth by instructing the agent to never trust the implementer's self-report, requiring manual diff verification and independent execution of project gate commands.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references external tools and packages from well-known sources.
- Evidence: Mentions installation of the
@openai/codexpackage via npm. OpenAI is recognized as a well-known service provider. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the orchestrator agent to execute shell commands to dispatch tasks.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains example commands for running a relay script usingnodeand project-specific "gate" commands (tests, build scripts). - [SAFE]: The skill explicitly omits executable scripts (specifically
scripts/relay.mjs) from its distribution. It provides documentation-only templates and advises the user to separately obtain and audit the necessary runtime components, reducing the risk of executing unverified bundled code.
Audit Metadata