codex-fable5
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and install a plugin from an untrusted community repository (
baskduf/FableCodex) using thecodex plugin marketplace addcommand. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By instructing the user or agent to download a plugin from an unknown source and then add its
bindirectory to thePATH, the skill enables the execution of remote code downloaded from a third-party repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include bash commands to modify the environment and execute helper binaries (
codex-fable5 status,codex-fable5 goals create, etc.) that are provided by the external plugin. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the installation of third-party binaries and their integration into the execution environment via
PATHmodification, allowing for the runtime execution of externally provided code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and 'adapt' third-party prompts, 'leaked' system prompts, and external documentation, which are untrusted data sources.
- Ingestion points: Processes third-party prompt guidance, 'Claude/Fable-flavored' prompt guidance, and model cards found in the workspace or provided by the user (File: SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill mentions treating third-party files as 'untrusted source material', but does not provide robust delimiters for the agent when processing this data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to perform network-linked plugin installations and execute shell commands (File: SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: The instructions advise ignoring or rewriting content that conflicts with active rules, though this relies on the model's adherence to the instruction rather than technical enforcement.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata