copilot-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to fetch and use a relay script (
relay.mjs) from a community-maintained GitHub repository (amElnagdy/delegate-skills). This source is external to the skill and not associated with a recognized trusted vendor.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator is instructed to execute shell commands involvingnodeand thecopilotCLI. These commands interact with the host system and the repository being modified.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a script at a runtime-determined path (relay.mjs). This script is not part of the skill's own package, increasing the risk of executing unverified code.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture creates an attack surface where the orchestrator agent processes untrusted data produced by the GitHub Copilot CLI. A malicious implementer output could attempt to influence the orchestrator through theresult.jsonreport or the modified source code. - Ingestion points: The agent reads
result.json,events.jsonl, and the git repository files after delegation. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks technical boundary markers or sanitization for these inputs, relying instead on narrative instructions for the agent to verify work.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator possesses shell execution and file system access capabilities.
- Sanitization: No systematic sanitization of external tool outputs is described.
Audit Metadata