cursor-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a delegation pattern where instructions ('briefs') provided by a user or orchestrator are passed to an external agent with file-system and command-execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads tasks from
brief.txtor stdin (detailed inreferences/dispatch-and-poll.md). - Boundary markers: Instructions are structured using XML-style tags (e.g.,
<task>,<action_safety>,<verification_loop>) to help the implementer distinguish the task from constraints (detailed inreferences/writing-the-brief.md). - Capability inventory: The delegated agent (
cursor-agent) possesses extensive capabilities to modify the working tree and execute shell commands, such as tests, linters, and build scripts (detailed inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill mandates that the orchestrator must perform a manual review of all diffs (
touchedFiles) and re-run all project gates locally before committing any changes (detailed inreferences/review-and-land.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
cursor-agentCLI to perform automated coding tasks. It explicitly documents the use of the--forceflag for automatic command execution and the--trustflag to bypass workspace trust prompts, while advising that these should only be used in trusted repositories. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation directs users to install the Cursor CLI from
cursor.com/cli, which is an official source for the service. It also references an external script (relay.mjs) that is not included in the skill bundle, explicitly advising users to obtain and review the upstream runtime separately.
Audit Metadata