delegating-to-agents
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that explicitly aim to bypass safety filters and security constraints in downstream agents.
- Evidence: Recommends using
claude --permission-mode bypassPermissionsandcodex --yoloto ensure autonomous operation by removing built-in safety prompts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides patterns for executing and automating shell commands that bypass interactive user confirmation.
- Evidence: The instructions for using
cmux sendfollowed bycmux send-key enterare designed to automate command input in a way that avoids manual review. - Evidence: The use of the
--yoloflag with the Codex CLI is a documented method to suppress confirmation prompts for generated code execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by delegating instructions across agent boundaries without mandatory sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Processes instructions passed via
cmux sendto target agent surfaces. - Boundary markers: Recommends using double quotes to wrap prompts but lacks explicit instruction to ignore embedded malicious content in the relayed payload.
- Capability inventory: Possesses full shell execution capability through the orchestrated agents (Codex, Claude, Pi, Hermes).
- Sanitization: Lacks sanitization beyond simple shell-escaping recommendations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata