delegating-to-agents

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that explicitly aim to bypass safety filters and security constraints in downstream agents.
  • Evidence: Recommends using claude --permission-mode bypassPermissions and codex --yolo to ensure autonomous operation by removing built-in safety prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides patterns for executing and automating shell commands that bypass interactive user confirmation.
  • Evidence: The instructions for using cmux send followed by cmux send-key enter are designed to automate command input in a way that avoids manual review.
  • Evidence: The use of the --yolo flag with the Codex CLI is a documented method to suppress confirmation prompts for generated code execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by delegating instructions across agent boundaries without mandatory sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Processes instructions passed via cmux send to target agent surfaces.
  • Boundary markers: Recommends using double quotes to wrap prompts but lacks explicit instruction to ignore embedded malicious content in the relayed payload.
  • Capability inventory: Possesses full shell execution capability through the orchestrated agents (Codex, Claude, Pi, Hermes).
  • Sanitization: Lacks sanitization beyond simple shell-escaping recommendations.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 10, 2026, 01:49 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — delegating-to-agents