delegating-to-agents
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute tools with flags designed to bypass security guardrails and user confirmation prompts. Specifically, it recommends using
codex --yoloandclaude --permission-mode bypassPermissions. These configurations remove the human-in-the-loop requirement, allowing the AI to execute arbitrary code or system modifications without review. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions provide specific patterns for driving terminal multiplexers (
cmux) to send commands to other agents. This includes methods to simulate keyboard input (send-key ... enter) and bypass terminal constraints, which grants the orchestrating agent direct, unmediated control over the host environment and other agent sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestration workflow involves relaying instructions between different LLM-based agents (Pi, Codex, Claude, Hermes). This creates a significant attack surface where untrusted data processed by one agent can be interpolated into commands or prompts sent to another, potentially leading to a chain-reaction exploit across the agent cluster.
- Ingestion points: Data received from the user or tool outputs intended for relay (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions for separating relay data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Direct shell access via
cmux,codex,pi, andclaude(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: None provided; instructions focus on ensuring commands are not "broken" by shell escaping rather than sanitizing content.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata