delegating-to-agents

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute tools with flags designed to bypass security guardrails and user confirmation prompts. Specifically, it recommends using codex --yolo and claude --permission-mode bypassPermissions. These configurations remove the human-in-the-loop requirement, allowing the AI to execute arbitrary code or system modifications without review.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions provide specific patterns for driving terminal multiplexers (cmux) to send commands to other agents. This includes methods to simulate keyboard input (send-key ... enter) and bypass terminal constraints, which grants the orchestrating agent direct, unmediated control over the host environment and other agent sessions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestration workflow involves relaying instructions between different LLM-based agents (Pi, Codex, Claude, Hermes). This creates a significant attack surface where untrusted data processed by one agent can be interpolated into commands or prompts sent to another, potentially leading to a chain-reaction exploit across the agent cluster.
  • Ingestion points: Data received from the user or tool outputs intended for relay (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions for separating relay data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Direct shell access via cmux, codex, pi, and claude (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: None provided; instructions focus on ensuring commands are not "broken" by shell escaping rather than sanitizing content.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 12:06 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — delegating-to-agents