dispatch
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the AI agent to invoke local shell commands, specifically
codex execandagy -p. These tools are described as having agentic capabilities, including file system modification (workspace-write). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: Processes content from issues, PR descriptions, diffs, and READMEs as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill recommends using stdin or temporary files with quoted here-doc delimiters to isolate untrusted input from the shell command.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages the Bash tool to execute external CLI commands and acknowledges the ability to edit files and run commands via the
agytool. - Sanitization: It provides clear instructions to avoid string interpolation and shell expansion, although compliance depends on the LLM following these behavioral guidelines correctly.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Deceptive metadata and tool references are present. The skill mentions a 'Google Antigravity CLI' and models like 'Nano Banana Pro' and 'GPT-OSS'. 'Antigravity' is a well-known Python easter egg rather than an official Google CLI for Gemini. These fabricated or non-standard tool names may mislead users into installing or executing untrusted binaries that masquerade as legitimate services.
Audit Metadata