distribute-skill-to-all-agents
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands such as
cpandrsyncto move files between directories in the user's home folder. It interpolates the$SKILLvariable directly into command strings without sanitization, creating a potential command injection vulnerability if the skill name is derived from untrusted input.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables the propagation of other skills across multiple agent environments (Claude, Codex, Pi, Hermes). This increases the attack surface for indirect prompt injection, as a malicious skill can be automatically synced to all agents on the system. Evidence Chain:\n - Ingestion points: Reads directory names and file paths from the user's home directory (e.g.,
~/.agents/skills/).\n - Boundary markers: None. No explicit instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the skills being moved.\n
- Capability inventory: Includes the ability to write to and overwrite files in multiple agent configuration directories (
~/.claude/,~/.pi/,~/.hermes/).\n - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the folder names or the contents of the
SKILL.mdfiles being distributed.
Audit Metadata