docx-official
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains meta-instructions in
SKILL.mdthat explicitly direct the AI agent to bypass standard tool usage constraints. Specifically, the instructions 'MANDATORY - READ ENTIRE FILE' and 'NEVER set any range limits' for the
docx-js.mdandooxml.mddocumentation files attempt to override platform-level optimizations for reading large files. Additionally, the skill's primary function of processing untrusted.docxfiles and converting them to Markdown for agent review presents an indirect prompt injection surface. Evidence of this attack surface includes: - Ingestion points: External document content converted via
pandocor parsed directly from OOXML XML files (e.g.,word/document.xml). - Boundary markers: Absent in instructions; the agent is simply told to 'Review the document and identify ALL changes needed'.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (
soffice,git), write to the file system, and generate/execute Python and JavaScript scripts. - Sanitization: While the skill uses
defusedxmlto prevent XML-based attacks like XXE, it does not sanitize the natural language content of the documents before processing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python
subprocess.runmodule to execute system commands includingsoffice(for document validation/conversion) andgit(for diffing changes). Although the skill implements path validation viasafe_user_pathand uses hardcoded command-line arguments to mitigate risks, the ability to execute external binaries remains a sensitive capability.
Audit Metadata