electron-drive-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands defined in the project's configuration file for building the application.
- Evidence: In
scripts/drive.mjs, thestartfunction usesspawnSync(config.build, { cwd: PROJECT_ROOT, stdio: 'inherit', shell: true })to run the build command specified indrive.config.json. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill enables the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code in both the renderer and main processes of the Electron application.
- Evidence: In
scripts/daemon.mjs, themaincommand handler usesnew AsyncFunction('electron', body)(electron)to execute code in the main process, providing full access to Node.js APIs within the app's context. Theevalcommand usespage.evaluatefor renderer-side execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes application UI state and logs.
- Ingestion points: The
snapshotcommand inscripts/daemon.mjsretrieves the accessibility tree (DOM structure), and thelogscommand retrieves console output and log files. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between application data and potential malicious instructions embedded in the UI or logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
spawnSyncindrive.mjs) and arbitrary JavaScript in the main process (AsyncFunctionindaemon.mjs), which includes file system and network access. - Sanitization: Absent. Content retrieved from the application is passed to the agent without filtering or sanitization.
Audit Metadata