evolution
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches an installation shell script from an external community repository:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ZhangHanDong/makepad-skills/main/install.sh. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The downloaded script is executed via
bash, which facilitates arbitrary remote code execution from a source outside of the vendor's own infrastructure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill establishes persistence and intercepts agent operations by modifying
.claude/settings.jsonand adding executable shell scripts to.claude/hooks/. These hooks are configured to trigger automatically duringUserPromptSubmit,PreToolUse, andPostToolUseevents. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]:\n
- Ingestion points: User prompts are intercepted and processed by the
makepad-skill-router.shhook to dynamically route queries to different skills.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or security markers defined to prevent malicious instructions embedded in user data from influencing the routing logic.\n
- Capability inventory: The system utilizes persistent hooks to execute local bash scripts and can modify the agent's runtime environment configuration.\n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization of the user prompt before it is ingested by the routing hook mechanism.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata