evolution

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches an installation shell script from an external community repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ZhangHanDong/makepad-skills/main/install.sh.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The downloaded script is executed via bash, which facilitates arbitrary remote code execution from a source outside of the vendor's own infrastructure.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill establishes persistence and intercepts agent operations by modifying .claude/settings.json and adding executable shell scripts to .claude/hooks/. These hooks are configured to trigger automatically during UserPromptSubmit, PreToolUse, and PostToolUse events.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]:\n
  • Ingestion points: User prompts are intercepted and processed by the makepad-skill-router.sh hook to dynamically route queries to different skills.\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or security markers defined to prevent malicious instructions embedded in user data from influencing the routing logic.\n
  • Capability inventory: The system utilizes persistent hooks to execute local bash scripts and can modify the agent's runtime environment configuration.\n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization of the user prompt before it is ingested by the routing hook mechanism.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 14, 2026, 10:59 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — evolution