expo-animation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a command
npx --yes submit-expo-feedback@latestfor the agent to execute for reporting feedback. This pattern downloads and runs an unverified package from the public npm registry without user confirmation. The package namesubmit-expo-feedbackdoes not align with official Expo naming conventions (which typically use the@expo/scope), presenting a significant supply chain risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The feedback reporting command uses shell interpolation for the feedback content (
"<actionable feedback>"). This allows for arbitrary shell command execution if the agent populates the field with unsanitized data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The feedback mechanism creates an attack surface where untrusted data (user complaints or error reports) can reach a command execution sink.
- Ingestion points: User-provided feedback or error reports processed by the agent (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None; the feedback is wrapped in double quotes but lacks instructions for escaping or sanitization.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution via
npx(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not instruct the agent to validate or escape the feedback content before passing it to the shell.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the installation of multiple external dependencies, including
react-native-reanimated,react-native-worklets,react-native-gesture-handler,expo-haptics, andreact-native-keyboard-controller. While common in the Expo ecosystem, these represent a broad external dependency footprint.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata