expo-animation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a command npx --yes submit-expo-feedback@latest for the agent to execute for reporting feedback. This pattern downloads and runs an unverified package from the public npm registry without user confirmation. The package name submit-expo-feedback does not align with official Expo naming conventions (which typically use the @expo/ scope), presenting a significant supply chain risk.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The feedback reporting command uses shell interpolation for the feedback content ("<actionable feedback>"). This allows for arbitrary shell command execution if the agent populates the field with unsanitized data.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The feedback mechanism creates an attack surface where untrusted data (user complaints or error reports) can reach a command execution sink.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided feedback or error reports processed by the agent (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None; the feedback is wrapped in double quotes but lacks instructions for escaping or sanitization.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution via npx (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not instruct the agent to validate or escape the feedback content before passing it to the shell.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the installation of multiple external dependencies, including react-native-reanimated, react-native-worklets, react-native-gesture-handler, expo-haptics, and react-native-keyboard-controller. While common in the Expo ecosystem, these represent a broad external dependency footprint.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 02:19 AM