expo-cicd-workflows
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains deceptive metadata in
SKILL.mdclaiming to be an "official" resource from theexpo/skillsrepository and using the@expoNPM namespace. Since the skill is authored bysickn33, this impersonation is a serious trust violation that could lead users or agents to grant unnecessary permissions or trust to the skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the agent to execute shell commands to install dependencies (
npm install) and run local utility scripts (fetch.jsandvalidate.js). This requirement for local code execution increases the attack surface of the execution environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves technical documentation and JSON schemas from official Expo endpoints (
api.expo.devandgithub.com/expo/expo). These are recognized well-known sources for the Expo development platform and are used to provide the validation logic for the skill. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
fetch.jsutility allows for arbitrary URL fetching and local caching. This tool could be leveraged as a data exfiltration vector if the agent is manipulated into appending sensitive data to URL parameters when calling the script. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and validates untrusted user-provided YAML workflow files. This processing creates an indirect injection surface where malicious instructions embedded in a workflow file could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the validation or explanation process.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata