faf-expert
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install the
faf-clitool globally vianpm. This package is managed by a source not listed as a trusted vendor. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The configuration examples utilize
npxto download and execute theclaude-faf-mcppackage. This allows for the execution of remote code at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides and uses various CLI tools (
faf init,faf score,faf bi-sync) to perform file operations and system checks. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
faf mcp installcommand modifies Model Context Protocol configuration files. This registers third-party tools as persistent agents that run in subsequent AI sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external project data to create AI behavioral instructions, introducing an attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Reads project identity, stack details, and architecture from
.fafand other local files. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to prevent the agent from being influenced by malicious text within the processed project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and write to sensitive instruction files like
.cursorrulesandCLAUDE.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization logic is present to filter out potentially malicious prompt content from the ingested project DNA.
Audit Metadata