figma-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to configure an external MCP server endpoint at
https://rube.app/mcp. This introduces a dependency on a third-party service provider for the skill's core functionality. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates on external data provided by Figma files and comments, which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted external content using tools such as
FIGMA_GET_FILE_JSONandFIGMA_GET_COMMENTS_IN_A_FILE(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill includes a 'Comment and export boundary' section which provides procedural guidelines, such as requiring explicit user authorization for posting comments, to mitigate accidental obedience to instructions found in design files.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools with write capabilities, including
FIGMA_ADD_A_COMMENT_TO_A_FILE, and file operations likeFIGMA_DOWNLOAD_FIGMA_IMAGES(SKILL.md), which could be targeted by adversarial content within Figma nodes. - Sanitization: While the skill mentions validating temporary URLs and protecting credentials, it does not describe specific sanitization or filtering logic for the textual content retrieved from Figma assets.
Audit Metadata