figma-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to configure an external MCP server endpoint at https://rube.app/mcp. This introduces a dependency on a third-party service provider for the skill's core functionality.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates on external data provided by Figma files and comments, which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted external content using tools such as FIGMA_GET_FILE_JSON and FIGMA_GET_COMMENTS_IN_A_FILE (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill includes a 'Comment and export boundary' section which provides procedural guidelines, such as requiring explicit user authorization for posting comments, to mitigate accidental obedience to instructions found in design files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools with write capabilities, including FIGMA_ADD_A_COMMENT_TO_A_FILE, and file operations like FIGMA_DOWNLOAD_FIGMA_IMAGES (SKILL.md), which could be targeted by adversarial content within Figma nodes.
  • Sanitization: While the skill mentions validating temporary URLs and protecting credentials, it does not describe specific sanitization or filtering logic for the textual content retrieved from Figma assets.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 28, 2026, 07:29 PM