gh-attach
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires access to the GitHub
user_sessionbrowser cookie to function. This cookie is a full-account credential that is not scoped like a Personal Access Token. The skill explicitly guides the agent to access interactive browser profiles (Chromium, Firefox, or Safari) to retrieve this sensitive data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs an extension from a community-maintained GitHub repository (
sudosubin/gh-attach) which is outside of the verified vendor scope. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By installing a third-party GitHub extension, the agent executes code provided by an external community author. While the version is pinned to
v0.4.2, the security of the extension has not been independently verified. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external GitHub attachment URLs (
user-attachments), which can be controlled by third parties and used to deliver malicious files or instructions. - Ingestion points: Remote GitHub attachment URLs processed via the
gh attach downloadcommand. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instruction-ignoring warnings are implemented for downloaded content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities through the
-Ooutput flag and network capabilities via thegh attachcommand suite. - Sanitization: The skill does not describe any sanitization or validation of the contents of downloaded attachments before they are placed into the local file system.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata